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Economic Perspective 3 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REGIDJIAL CONTROL: OPTIONS FOR REFORM* 
Chris Moore and Simon Booth 
Department of Administration, Strathclyde Business School 
The MSC i s extremely s ignif icant to the 
Scottish economy. In 1985-86 i t spent 
nearly £134 m i l l i o n on t r a i n i n g and 
employment act ivi t ies in Scotland and this 
i s planned to r i s e to £184 mill ion by 
1988-89. The various MSC schemes in 
Scotland affected some 60,000 individuals 
including 24,000 school leavers . The 
Commission d i rec t ly employs over 2,000 
staff in Scotland. 
The quasi-autonomous Scottish Regional 
Committee was intended to provide a 
Scottish dimension to manpower policies in 
conjunction with a devolved S c o t t i s h 
Assembly. The Assembly never appeared, 
but the Scottish Committee (SC) was set up 
and has remained l ike an odd piece of 
f lotsam above the highwater mark of 
nationalism. I t is one of the surviving 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s from the p e r i o d of 
corporat ism in the 1970s. Does i t 
perform a useful function? Can a case be 
made out for i t s continued existence? 
should be able to identify its capacity to 
perform any useful tasks. 
The Manpower Services Commission (MSC) is 
characterised by centralised policy-making 
and local ised programme implementation. 
Key d e c i s i o n s regarding strategy and 
resource a l locat ions are taken a t the 
c e n t r e in n e g o t i a t i o n s between the 
Commission and Department of Employment. 
At the other end of the operation, the 
delivery of a range of services in the 
employment and t ra ining f ie ld i s l e f t to 
local area offices working in co-operation 
with Area Boards (ABs) which ref lec t the 
' t r i p a r t i t e 1 s t ructure of the Commission 
in the i r composition. So what function 
does the Scottish Committee perform? 
Goals 
Organisational h e a l t h : 
checklist 
The formal goals appear to be to ensure 
a minimum that the MSC Headquarters i s sensitive to 
the conditions prevailing in Scotland, to 
check t h a t Area Boards f u l f i l t h e i r 
func t ion , and to d i f fuse p o t e n t i a l 
criticism. These goals are vague rather 
than c l e a r and measurable, and the 
S c o t t i s h Committee l a c k s adequa t e 
resources to begin to achieve them. 
From the l i t e r a t u r e on organisational 
analysis (Perrow, 1970), a number of basic 
e l e m e n t s can be i d e n t i f i e d which 
constitute the minimum necessary to ensure 
tha t there i s a t l eas t the capacity for 
organisations to undertake the i r tasks. 
These include: goals, accountabil i ty, 
authority and responsibi l i ty , policy-
making capac i ty and r e s o u r c e s , and 
integration and co-ordination. If we now 
look at the SC under these headings we 
•This a r t i c l e i s based on work carried out as part of the ESRC Corporatism and 
Accountability i n i t i a t i v e , 'The Growth and Nature of Scottish Corporatism', ESRC grant 
number E0 4250012. I t i s a revised version of a paper presented to the ESRC's 
Tripartism and Training Workshop, Polytechnic of Central London, November 1986. 
Accountability and structure 
We have d e s c r i b e d the MSC as an 
organisation of centralised policy-making 
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and devolved administration. Within i t s 
s t ruc ture there i s a missing l ink of 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y between the r eg iona l 
committees and the operational divisions 
which report directly to MSC in Sheffield. 
Funct iona l o p e r a t i o n a l d ivis ions cut 
ac ross geographic boundar ies . The 
S c o t t i s h Commit tee has no d i r e c t 
operational responsibility or control over 
act ivi t ies of the MSC in Scotland. Staff 
are not Scot t ish Office c iv i l servants. 
T h e i r c a r e e r p r o g r e s s i o n and 
organisational identity are not based on a 
Scottish interest . 
The MSC i s accountable for operational 
matters in Scotland to the Secretary of 
S t a t e for Scot land , but sen ior MSC 
o f f i c i a l s in Scotland are managerially 
responsible to Sheffield. The Office for 
Scotland remains a small co-ordinating 
unit without any formal powers to actually 
c o - o r d i n a t e anyth ing . Key c e n t r a l 
services are based in Sheffield. Even 
the designation of Scotland as a distinct 
region in terms of MSC o p e r a t i o n a l 
a c t i v i t i e s has l o s t some coherence with 
ttie decision to merge the Scottish end of 
the Skills Training Agency with North-East 
England (MSC, 1986a). 
The sponsoring government department for 
Scotland i s the Industry Department for 
Scotland (IDS), which provides most of the 
Commission's funding from i t s vo te . 
Generally, Scottish office civil servants 
have played a 'hands off role, exercising 
oversight but with minimum direction over 
o p e r a t i o n a l i s s u e s . Although the 
majority of MSC act ivi t ies in Scotland are 
funded through IDS, the most s ignif icant 
non-devolved item of expenditure i s the 
Community Programme which remains under 
the DE vote. 
Authority and responsibility 
The posi t ion of the Scot t ish Secretary 
with some formal responsib i l i ty for MSC 
operations in Scotland does give the 
important possibility of a Scottish input 
into policy-making at the centre, in a way 
in which a purely c o n s u l t a t i v e ro l e 
without any executive powers would not 
allow (Millan, 1981), and which is missing 
in English r eg ions . However, t h i s 
respons ib i l i ty i s exercised jointly with 
the Secretary of State for Employment and 
cannot be seen in the same l i gh t as the 
relationship between the Scot t ish Office 
and purely Scott ish quangos l ike the 
Scottish Development Agency or Highlands 
and Islands Development Board which offer 
a distinctive input into industrial policy 
(Hood and Young, 1984) in ways which are 
not possible with MSC. 
The Committee for Scotland i s the ultimate 
advisory body of MSC in Scotland. I t has 
no e x e c u t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s or 
authori ty. The ABs provide the local 
advisory input, overseeing the act ivi t ies 
of area o f f i c e s of the Commission's 
o p e r a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s . Abs have a 
particular remit to monitor Youth Training 
Scheme (YTS) and Community Programme (CP) 
p r o j e c t s . They are not d i r e c t l y 
r e s p o n s i b l e , however, for resource 
a l locat ions within the i r areas or for 
s trategy, but concentrate on the design 
and delivery of i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t s . 
They have the a u t h o r i t y to r e j e c t 
a p p l i c a t i o n s from sponsors and to 
terminate established projects, but only 
i f they f a i l to meet the c r i t e r i a la id 
down by the Commssion centrally. 
Policy-making capacity and resources 
Whilst MSC expenditure in Scotland comes 
out of the Scottish Office budget, i t l ies 
outside the block grant system governing 
the bulk of public spending in Scotland 
(Keating and Midwinter, 1983). This 
effect ively means that the Secretary of 
State for Scotland has no d i rec t control 
over the d i s t r ibu t ion of expenditure and 
in par t i cu la r no capacity to switch the 
MSC's 'Scottish budget' between different 
programme headings within the Scott ish 
Office. Thus the allocation of resources 
between different programmes and between 
regions i s decided centrally. The MSC in 
Scotland cannot change policy priori t ies 
or programme cr i te r ia and i s constrained 
in bending resources to meet the needs of 
small areas. We have highlighted th i s 
rigidity in relation to MSC's involvement 
in the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal 
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Project (GEAR). Despite being one of the 
formal p a r t n e r s in t h i s major urban 
renewal ini t ia t ive which was designed to 
'bend* public resources in to the inner 
c i ty , the MSC has largely continued to 
apply centra l ly derived c r i t e r i a to i t s 
programmes with adverse consequences for 
local res idents competing in an open 
labour market (Moore and Booth, 1984). 
Budgets for major programmes like the CP 
and Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS) are 
based on levels of unemployment by region 
and dis t r ibuted at an area level on the 
same c r i t e r i a . There i s some room for 
manoeuvre with resources being transferred 
across regions and between areas depending 
on take-up of places, but t h i s does not 
affect the basic philosophy of centralised 
planning. Similarly the distribution of 
YTS resources are decided a t the centre, 
including the proportionate share between 
Mode A and B places. Again this can have 
unintended consequences for par t icular 
l o c a l i t i e s . For example, the shif t 
towards Mode A schemes and transition to a 
two year YTS assumes t h a t the l o c a l 
economic base has the capacity within the 
p r i v a t e sec to r to absorb increased 
t ra ining demand without d i l u t i n g the 
quality of the schemes. This may be true 
of the South East of England, but does not 
necessarily apply to the depressed markets 
of areas l ike Clydeside (McArthur and 
McGregor, 1986). 
C e n t r a l i s e d c o n t r o l over p o l i c y 
p r i o r i t i e s , programme c r i t e r i a and 
resource allocation mean that the Scottish 
Plan cannot be seen as a d i s t inc t ive 
strategy for Scotland, but as the Scottish 
component of MSC's o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y . 
Perhaps the most d i s t inc t ive element of 
the Scott ish Plan l i e s in re la t ing MSC 
programmes to the Scottish educational 
system. The o p e r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of 
national schemes must allow scope for 
local discretion, but in practice the most 
important arena for such discretion is the 
area not the regional level . The MSC 
Corporate Plan emphasises the importance 
of this local level for i t s operations: 
"Different local labour markets have 
different needs, and adaptability is 
essen t ia l . The Commission w i l l 
therefore increase i t s use of local 
de l ive ry mechanisms. I t s Area 
Manpower Boards, with the i r local 
knowledge and expertise, will have a 
key r o l e to p lay in f i t t i n g 
programmes to local needs" (MSC, 
1986b, para 1.11). 
Almost as an afterthought the paragraph 
goes on to refer to the "valuable work of 
i t s other Advisory Boards and Committees". 
The l a t e s t Annual Report outlined an 
enhanced r o l e for Area Boards , 
strengthening their direct accountabili ty 
to the Commission through a requirement to 
submit annual reports (MSC, 1986c, para 
6.27). 
Scope for local managerial discret ion 
exists but there i s nothing distinctively 
Scottish about t h i s . When key elements 
of MSC act ivi t ies work through franchising 
responsibi l i ty for delivery to outside 
agencies there i s inevitably a high degree 
of inter-organisational and interest group 
ba rga in ing , but t h i s occurs a t the 
national policy-making level or at Area 
Board level, not at the Scottish Committee 
level. 
There are thus two major limiting factors 
on the role of the Scott ish Committee in 
the policy-making and implementation 
process. One is the organisation of the 
MSC which e m p h a s i s e s management 
accountabili ty based on funct ion not 
region, and the other is the importance of 
local laour markets as the operational 
paradigm of most Commission programmes. 
Integration and co-ordination 
If the Scottish policy-making community 
can be characterised as a v i l lage , then 
the MSC i s r a t h e r l i k e the week-end 
vi l lager maintaining a country cottage 
r a t h e r than a r e s i d e n t . This i s 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y so i f one looks a t the 
anomalous p o s i t i o n of the S c o t t i s h 
Committee which, in the e s sen t i a l s of 
pol icy-making , resource a l l o c a t i o n , 
programme implementation and managerial 
accountability is largely by-passed. The 
Area Boards over which i t exercises a 
s u p e r v i s o r y r e l a t i o n s h i p a c t as 
s igni f icant channels of consensus a t the 
l oca l l e v e l , b r inging the d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e r e s t groups toge the r and forging 
l i n k a g e s be tween the Commission's 
operational arms. I t i s a t t h i s level 
where key programmes l ike the YTS and CP 
are transmitted from policy to actual 
projects on the ground. I t i s at th i s 
level where the bargaining process between 
the different interests has some meaning, 
albeit within centrally defined c r i t e r i a 
and resource allocations. 
The Scottish Committee, in the absence of 
any d i rec t controls over the area leve l , 
cannot be expected to effectively monitor 
key MSC a c t i v i t i e s in Scotland. Given 
i t s lack of executive responsibilities i t 
i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t problems a r e 
referred to Sheffield. 
Does this mean that the Area Boards should 
indeed be given a more enhanced role to 
play within the MSC's structure, including 
possibily some executive and financial 
powers? The i m p l i c a t i o n s for the 
posit ion of the Scott ish Committee from 
any such devolution to the areas seem al l 
too clear . If i t s ro le i s somewhat 
ambiguous and anomalous now, i t w i l l 
become even l e s s t enab l e in such a 
s i tua t ion . The regional input in the 
decision-making process would decline 
since area boards are more l ike ly to 
identify with local i n t e r e s t s . Indeed, 
the r ea l i t y of a Scott ish in t e res t or 
consensus emerging from the area level i s 
misplaced. Area Boards are as likely to 
identify themselves with areas facing 
similar problems in other parts of the UK 
as they are with other Scott ish areas. 
Simply being based in Scotland does not 
guarantee a common interest. 
Marginalisation of the SC's role without 
any exp l i c i t decision on i t s future i s 
cer ta inly one scenario, but i t i s not an 
a t t r a c t i v e one for those concerned about 
the operations of MSC in Scotland. Thus, 
in the next section we consider three 
options, two of which would actually 
involve some conscious decision-making by 
the centre. 
Options 
Option 1 - Abolition 
The f i r s t opt ion would involve the 
a b o l i t i o n of the Committee and the 
creation of more direct links between MSC 
at the centre and the Area Boards. In 
the absence of a Scottish Committee there 
would probably be considerable pressure 
for devolved powers to the local level . 
The advantage of abol i t ion i s that i t 
would c l a r i f y the r e s p e c t i v e g o a l s , 
authority and accountability of the centre 
and ABs. On the other hand the political 
•trump card' r o l e which the S c o t t i s h 
Committee can play as a focus of lobbying 
and a deflect ion of po l i t i c a l c r i t i c i sm, 
would be sacrificed. 
Option 2 - The s t a t u s quo - the paper 
tiger? 
Retaining a Scott ish Committee has some 
symbolic purpose for the centre in that i t 
gives the appearance of devolved power 
without the substance. Removing this fig 
leaf might ra i se some sharp dilemmas a t 
the centre concerning i t s re la t ionship 
with the l o c a l i t i e s . In the absence of 
p o l i t i c a l d e v o l u t i o n t h e S c o t t i s h 
Committee has taken on the appearance of 
an organisation in search of a role. 
Option 3 - Rebirth: strengthening the 
Scottish dimension 
This option gives the MSC a real Scottish 
dimension in i t s pol icy-making and 
management by devolving powers to the SC. 
Rather than the exis t ing covert lobbying 
for r e s o u r c e s and i n f l u e n c e such 
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devo lu t i on would open up the d e c i s i o n -
making p r o c e s s . The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e 
for Scot land would have more e x p l i c i t 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r MSC o p e r a t i o n s in 
Sco t l and , wi th the S c o t t i s h Committee 
reporting to the Scot t i sh off ice. As a t 
present the centre would se t broad policy 
o b j e c t i v e s and d e t e r m i n e the o v e r a l l 
a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s , but devolved 
power would have to allow for var ia t ions 
in programmes and p r i o r i t i e s t o r e f l e c t 
Scot t ish needs. This change might s t i l l 
be achieved without further accountabil i ty 
t o the S c o t t i s h i n t e r e s t by a p roces s of 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e l e g a t i o n w i t h i n MSC. 
This in te rna l option would allow for more 
d i s c r e t i o n a t the r e g i o n a l l e v e l over 
m a t e r i a l r e sou rce s and p o l i c y , but t h i s 
would not necessari ly lead to s igni f icant 
var ia t ions in outcomes as the centre would 
s t i l l r e ta in f a i r ly t igh t control and the 
r e g i o n a l commit tee would answer to i t . 
The more radical a l t e rna t ive i s to devolve 
powers and resources to the SC which would 
answer to external bodies - the Scot t i sh 
o f f i c e and, in the event of p o l i t i c a l 
devolution, to a Scot t ish Assembly. This 
would i n v o l v e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o t h e 
Scot t i sh i n t e r e s t . 
Without making an exp l i c i t choice between 
a b o l i t i o n or r e b i r t h , the Committee for 
S c o t l a n d w i l l r e m a i n Someth ing of a 
paradox r e l a t i n g n e i t h e r t o the p o l i c y -
making p r o c e s s a t the c e n t r e , nor t o 
l abour markets a t t he l o c a l l e v e l . I f 
t h e Area Boards w e r e g i v e n g r e a t e r 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h i s p o s i t i o n would 
become more untenable. If there were, on 
the other hand, s igni f icant devolution to 
t h e r e g i o n a l l e v e l w i t h Area Boards 
d i r e c t l y a c c o u n t a b l e t o t h e S c o t t i s h 
Committee t h i s would mean a more radica l 
change i n t h e way t h e MSC o p e r a t e s . 
There may be benefi ts for Scotland i f such 
an op t ion were fo l lowed, not l e a s t in 
b r ing ing s t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for 
labour markets and t r a i n i n g more c l o s e l y 
i n t o t h e S c o t t i s h i n s t i t u t i o n a l and 
policy-making network. 
Conclusion 
We have not se t out to provide a bluepr int 
for r e o r g a n i s a i o n but to s p e c u l a t e upon 
some key o p t i o n s open to decision-makers 
r ega rd ing the fu tu re of the r e g i o n a l 
d i m e n s i o n . In t h e a b s e n c e of any 
e x p l i c i t d e c i s i o n s the s t a t u s quo w i l l 
reinforce the missing l ink which currently 
e x i s t s a t t h e S c o t t i s h l e v e l in te rms of 
policy-making and accountabil i ty for MSC's 
a c t i v i t i e s i n S c o t l a n d . Symbol i c 
concess ions t o a S c o t t i s h i d e n t i t y may 
s a t i s f y the c e n t r e but do not meet the 
need fo r e f f e c t i v e pol icy-making and 
accountabi l i ty . 
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